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Abstract—Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is mainly
launched by the transmission requirements between devices for
specific applications such as Proximity Services in Long-Term
Evolution Advanced (LTE-A) networks, and each application will
form a group of registered devices for the network-covered and
network-absent D2D communications. During the applications
of D2D communication, each device needs to identify the other
devices of the same group in proximity by their group identity.
This leads to the exposure of group information, by which
the usage of applications can be analyzed by eavesdroppers.
Hence, this work introduces network-covered and network-absent
authenticated key exchange protocols for D2D communications
to guarantee accountable group anonymity, end-to-end security
to network operators, as well as traceability and revocability for
accounting and management requirements. We formally prove
the security of those protocols, and also develop an analytic
model to evaluate the quality of authentication protocols by
authentication success rate in D2D communications. Besides, we
implement the proposed protocols on android mobile devices to
evaluate the computation costs of the protocols. We also evaluate
the authentication success rate by the proposed analytic model
and prove the correctness of the analytic model via simulation.
Those evaluations show that the proposed protocols are feasible
to the performance requirements of D2D communications.
Index Terms—D2D Communication, Proximity Service, Group
Anonymity, Mutual Authentication, End-to-End Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
DUE to the dramatic growth of the number of mobiledevices, providing mobile communication services with
higher throughput, lower traffic overhead, and lower energy
consumption are challenges. Although LTE-A physical-layer
provides even higher communication capability [1], the re-
source allocation in the evolved universal terrestrial radio
access network (E-UTRAN) to high density mobile devices
remains dilemma when the resource is limited. The 3rd genera-
tion partnership project (3GPP) proposes D2D communication
service in LTE-A, called Proximity Service (ProSe) [2], [3]
with three main purposes as follows: 1) the mobile network
operator can offload traffic of E-UTRAN and Evolved Packet
System (EPS) [4], which is the core network (CN) of the
LTE-A system; 2) D2D communication may support social
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network service, information sharing, advertising, gaming, and
conferencing services; and 3) the high availability of D2D
communication can be used to support public safety services.
Besides, security is essential to support the correctness of the
functions and the availability for D2D communications.
In ProSe, D2D communication can be classified as the
network-covered and network-absent according to whether its
control components are connected to CN (covered) or not
(absent). The authenticated key exchange (AKE) in ProSe have
to consider the connectivity between user equipments (UEs)
and CN and should provide security protection from various
kinds of attacks. Certain security threats have been discussed
in [5], i.e., eavesdropping between UEs, impersonation attack
on UE or evolved NodeB (eNB), and active attack by injecting
messages into traffic data or control data.
AKE guarantees the identification by mutual authentication
and confidentiality of communication by key exchange in
computer networks [6]–[8]. Additionally, the anonymous pro-
tection to user identity is critical due to the broadcast nature of
wireless communications. This security requirement has been
carefully deliberated in [9]–[18]. In mobile networks, an UE
should complete authentication for identity identification in
advance of requesting for services when roaming to a foreign
network (FN). The user anonymous authentication prevents
eavesdroppers or/and FN from disclosing the real identities of
UEs in every authentication session, whereby the locations of
UEs (i.e., footprints) may be tracked.
Anonymity can be divided as two levels, partial user
anonymity and full user anonymity. Partial user anonymous
authentication conceals identities from eavesdroppers, exclud-
ing FNs [9]–[11] and full user anonymous authentication
additionally considers FNs as eavesdroppers [12]–[16], [18].
In case of full user anonymity, traceability and revocability are
essential to support the permitted network operators to trace
and revoke user identities for management purposes. Certain
traceability and revocability techniques [12], [13], [18] have
been introduced to cancel the anonymity protection in secure
wireless communications.
The aforementioned studies provide elegant solutions to
support anonymous and secure wireless communication be-
tween users and networks. For D2D communications, two
secure D2D communication systems [19], [20] are proposed
to support data sharing with distinct application scenarios.
One [19] supports pseudonymity protection, where each real
identity is replaced with a corresponding pseudo identity so
that the sessions from the same device are traceable. The
other [20] offers partial user anonymity, where system is able
2to trace the footprints of users.
Nevertheless, the new anonymity issue for the group in-
formation arises when direct communications between de-
vices are launched for specific applications. In ProSe-enabled
devices, the group is formed by devices using the same
application. During the establishment of a D2D communica-
tion including device discovery procedure, the device, which
initiates the D2D communication, needs to announce messages
with an application identity so that it can be discovered by
other devices in the same application group. Attackers may
collect and analyze the application usage information and
launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks to specific
groups or observe the behaviors of users in proximity for
malicious purposes. Hence, group anonymous protection with
traceability should be considered in D2D communication to
protect the application information included in the announcing
message need to be protected while establishing D2D commu-
nications.
End-to-end security is another required security property as
devices exchange messages via D2D communications. This
security property prevents system operators, who help to es-
tablish D2D communications, from eavesdropping exchanging
messages between devices.
Security Difference. Compared to wireless communication,
D2D communications additionally consider entity authentica-
tion without involving security infrastructure (i.e., authentica-
tion server), privacy protection against network infrastructure,
group anonymity preventing from exposing group or applica-
tion related identity, and end-to-end security among devices.
A. Contributions
This work presents two group anonymous authenticated key
exchange protocols for network-covered and network-absent
D2D communications in mobile networks to support iden-
tity and group (application) anonymity, accountability (i.e.,
traceability and revocability), and end-to-end security against
insider attacker (between devices). Specifically, we first pro-
pose the group-anonymous D2D communication with CN-
assistance (CN-GD2C) protocol adopting identity-based en-
cryption (IBE) against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA),
Diffie-Hellman key exchange, symmetry-based encryption,
and hash functions. We also propose the group-anonymous
authenticated key exchange for network-absent D2D commu-
nication (NA-GD2C) protocol by utilizing the new proposed
identity-based k-anonymity secret handshake scheme with the
encryptions and proof technique by combining public-key
encryptions (key-private encryption and Linear encryption)
and zero-knowledge proof in the design. We then formally
prove the security of these two protocols and develop an an-
alytic model using queueing theory to evaluate authentication
success rates of the proposed protocols and demonstrate the
scalability and efficiency of the proposed protocols. We also
implement the proposed protocols to estimate the computation
costs on mobile devices, and obtain the authentication success
rates by both simulation and analytic model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the system and security models of
D2D communication in mobile networks. In Section III, we
propose group anonymous D2D communication protocols of
network-covered and network-absent cases. The security anal-
ysis and performance evaluation on the proposed protocols are
presented in Section IV and Section V, respectively. Finally,
we conclude this work in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM AND SECURITY MODELS
This section introduces the system model including the
functions of the system components and the operating pro-
cedures for secure D2D communications in ProSe [21], [22].
We then introduce the behaviors of the attackers, and propose
the security model and its definitions of the proposed system.
A. System Model and Security Requirements
1) The System Model: In ProSe, there are two kinds of
UEs, announcing UE (A-UE), who requests for establish-
ing D2D communication, and monitoring UE (M-UE), who
monitors the requests of D2D communications in proximity.
In network-covered D2D communications, each UE shares
long-term secret with authentication center/home subscriber
server (AuC/HSS), which is response for the user subscription
management, user authentication and session key management.
When UEs establish D2D communication for ProSe, they can
be either inside or outside of the coverage of CN. Each UE can
access E-UTRAN via eNB in its coverage. Before establishing
D2D communication, each A-UE and M-UE need to register
to ProSe function to obtain the required parameters for D2D
communication configuration.
In network-covered D2D communications, both A-UE and
M-UE attach to CN for device discovery procedure with au-
thentication and authorization. During a device discovery, the
ProSe function will send authentication requests to AuC/HSS
to authenticate participant devices. Once authentication re-
quests are received, HSS/AuC will produce the correspond-
ing authentication token for ProSe function to authenticate
the UEs. By the aforesaid parameters from ProSe function,
the A-UE can announce device discovery messages and be
discovered by the M-UEs of the same application groups.
In network-absent D2D communications, HSS/AuC assigns
each UE an identity with the corresponding private key of an
IBE system for secure D2D communication. The identity is
valid for a pre-defined duration and can be revoked as required.
In both communication modes, the application identity of each
UE for services are maintained by ProSe function.
2) The Security Requirements: According to the system
model, we analyze and propose the following security require-
ments that are urgently required in D2D communications.
• Authenticated key exchanged with end-to-end security: This
is to guarantee the authentication of intended participants
and confidentiality of the transmission between two UEs in
ProSe. Typically, two parties achieve authenticated key ex-
change (AKE) with end-to-end secure communication based
on a long-term secret only known by them. However, UEs
only share long-term secret key with the HSS/AuC located
in CN. Hence, AKE between two UEs needs the participa-
tion of the HSS/AuC and this leads the exchanged session
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Fig. 1: Attacker Models of ProSe between UEs
key between two UEs will be known by the HSS/AuC.
Namely, the communication between two UEs will be
exposed to the CN. In the sense of D2D communications,
communication confidentiality between two UEs should be
guaranteed. Hence, ProSe needs to achieve authenticated
key exchange with end-to-end security between two UEs.
• Identity and group anonymity: Identity anonymity is to
guarantee that the identities of the participants in each AKE
session are protected and cannot be linked between sessions
to prevent outsider attackers from tracing the footprints
of the participants. Besides that, group anonymity is also
essential in ProSe since the usage of applications of UEs in
ProSe is considered as sensitive information, which may be
analyzed and utilized for disturbing services. Only two UEs
in the same application group can successfully authenticate
each other and exchange a session key. If two UEs belong
to different groups, they are unable to learn identity and
group information of each other in authentication [23].
Obviously, AKE with group anonymity also guarantees
identity anonymity.
• Traceability and revocability: Traceability in group anony-
mous authentication guarantees the identity and group in-
formation of participants in every successful authentication
session can be disclosed when the identities of UEs in ProSe
are required for management or accounting purposes by
CN. Only authorized entity, e.g., HSS/AuC or ProSe, can
disclose the group and identity information. Revocability
ensures the identity of every UE can be revoked to terminate
D2D services.
B. Security Models and Definitions
Figure 1 shows the attacker model of ProSe. An outsider
attacker may eavesdrop the communications including the
exchanged messages, the identity information, or the group
information, between two UEs. It may break the confidentiality
of communications, trace the footprints of UEs, or probe the
using applications according to the group information. The
outsider attacker may also impersonate as a legal user to pass
the authentication and exchange a common session key with
any legal user. Furthermore, a legal user can be an attacker to
achieve mutual authentication and exchange a common session
key with any user belonging to different group. Additionally,
the ProSe function or HSS/AuC can be system attackers,
who eavesdrop the exchanged messages between devices in
D2D communications. This kind of attacker is commonly
not considered by the security solutions in mobile networks.
However, it makes sense to consider secure communication
against the system attackers as the messages are merely
exchanged between devices in D2D communications. Before
defining the attackers, we define an authenticated key exchange
protocol and the capabilities of attackers in the protocol as
follows.
The proposed protocol is Π, and Πt1U,V and Π
t2
V,U are
regarded as two instances to model two users U and V being
the partners of each other in the communication session t1 and
t2 of Π. We say that a matching conversation involving Π
t1
U,V
and Πt,2V,U if and only if t1 = t2 and U and V are partners.
The capability of an attacker can be captured by the following
oracles.
• Execute(Πt1U,V ,Π
t2
V,U ) : This oracle models a passive at-
tacker, who can intercept all communications between Πt1U,V
and Πt2V,U .
• Send(Πt1U,V ,m) : This oracle models an active attacker, who
sends a message m to Πt1U,V .
• Reveal(Πt1U,V ) : This oracle models the exposure of the
accepted session key of U shared with its partner V in the
session t1.
• Corrupt(Πt1U,V ) : This oracle models the exposure of the
long-term secret key of U during the session t1 with its
partner V .
• Test(Πt1U,V ) : When an attacker queries this oracle, it will
return a real session key, accepted by U with its partner V in
the session t1, or a random string according to a random bit
if the negotiation of the session key is complete. The query
of this oracle is failed, if the session key is not negotiated.
• TestID(Πt1U,V ) : When an attacker queries this oracle, it will
return the real identity of U or a random string according to
a random bit when U and V are accepted each other with
a negotiated session key. The query of this oracle is failed,
if the AKE is not fulfilled between U and V .
• TestGroup(Πt1U,V ) : When an attacker queries this oracle, it
will return the group information of U or a random string
according to a random bit when U and V are accepted each
other with a negotiated session key. The query of this oracle
is failed, if the AKE is not fulfilled between U and V .
We then define the security of AKE in ProSe according to
the discussed security requirements as follows.
Definition 1 (Mutul Authentication): There are a simulator
S, who simulates Πt1U,V or Π
t2
V,U by Π, and a probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) attacker A of Π, who can query
Execute and Send in polynomial time. After oracle queries,
4A sends a message to be accepted by Πt1U,V or Π
t2
V,U with the
advantage as follows:
AdvMAA = Pr[A accepted by Π
t1
U,V or Π
t,2
V,U ] (1)
The mutual authentication security of Π is guaranteed for U
and V if 1) Πt1U,V and Π
t2
V,U has a matching conversation with
and are accepted by each other and 2) AdvMAA is negligible.
Definition 2 (Key Exchange against System Operator): S
simulates Πt1U,V and Π
t2
U,V by Π to interact with A, who is
either an outsider attacker or a system attacker (i.e., HSS/AuC
or ProSe function), and can query Execute and Send in
polynomial time. After oracle queries, Πt1U,V and Π
t2
V,U are
accepted by each other with an exchanged session key KU,V ,
A queries Test to obtain KU,V or a random string from Π
t1
U,V
or Πt2V,U according to a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Then,A outputs
a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} with the following advantage.
AdvSKA = {Pr[b = b
′]− 1/2} (2)
If AdvSKA is negligible, we say Π achieves session key security.
Definition 3 (Identity Anonymity): S simulates Πt1U,V and
Πt2U,V by Π interacting with A and A can query Execute and
Send in polynomial time. After oracle queries, Πt1U,V and Π
t2
V,U
are accepted by each other, A queries TestID to obtain IDU
or IDV , or a random string from Π
t1
U,V or Π
t2
V,U according to
a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}
with the following advantage.
Advanon idA = {Pr[b = b
′]− 1/2} (3)
If Advanon idA is negligible, we say Π achieves identity
anonymity.
Definition 4 (Group Anonymity): The security of group
anonymity is similar to that of identity anonymity. Instead,
A queries TestGroup to obtain the group information or a
random string from Πt1U,V or Π
t,2
V,U according to b ∈ {0, 1}.
The advantage of guessing b from the output b′ ∈ {0, 1} of A
is as follows.
Adv
anon group
A
= {Pr[b = b′]− 1/2} (4)
If Adv
anon group
A
is negligible, we say Π achieves group
anonymity.
III. PROPOSED GROUP ANONYMOUS D2D
COMMUNICATIONS
In this section, we propose two group anonymous schemes
including the main building blocks for network-covered and
network-absent cases.
A. Preliminary
This section introduces the preliminaries of the proposed
protocols.
1) Bilinear Groups: We first define the used bilinear map
operation [25]–[28]. The bilinear maps is defined as e : G1 ×
G2 → GT , where all group G1, G2, and GT are multiplicative
and of prime order p. When g1 is a generator of G1 and g2
is a generator of G2, there exists a computable isomorphism
ψ from G2 to G1 such as ψ(g1) = g1. The map e has the
following properties: 1) bilinearity: for all u ∈ G1, b ∈ G2,
and (a, b) ∈ Z2p, e(u
a, vb) = e(u, v)ab; and 2) non-degeneracy:
e(g1, g2) 6= 1.
TABLE I: Notations
Notation Description
UEi user equipments i
eNB evolved node B
HSS/AuC home subscriber server/authentication center
IDi the real identities of UEi
UIDi the identity in IBE system
AIDi the application identity of UEi
GIDi the group identity of UEi
Ki the shared secret key between UEi and HSS/AuC
Kp the secret key only known by ProSe Function
AKi the authorization key of ProSe function for UEi
param the public parameters of an ID-based encryption
system
dID the IBE private key corresponding to ID
EIC(pk, ID, x) IND-CCA secure ID-based encryption with the
system public key pk, the identity ID, and the
input x
ES(K,x1, x2, · · · ) symmetric Encryption with inputs x1, x2, etc.
X = gx,Y = gy a Diffie-Hellman tuple [24], where (x, y) ∈ Z2p
and g ∈ G.
H(.), f0(.),
H1(.),H2(.)
secure one-way hash functions, where
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l , f0 : Z3p → {0, 1}
l ,
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗, H2 : GT → {0, 1}
n
2) Identity-based Encryption: The concept of identity-
based encryption (IBE) is to eliminate the management costs
of user certificates, i.e., verifying its correctness and its
revocation. A usable IBE is first proposed by Boneh and
Franklin [29] (BF-IBE) with IND-CCA in random oracle
model. It consists of four algorithms as follows.
• Setup: This algorithm is given a security parameter κ to
generate a prime p and two bilinear groups G and GT
such that a bilinear map e : G × G → GT holds. It then
chooses a random generator g ∈ G, sets Gpub = g
s for a
randomly selected s ∈ Zp, and chooses two cryptographic
hash functions, H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → G∗ and H2 : GT → {0, 1}
n
for some n. The message space is M = {0, 1}n and
the ciphertext space is C = G∗ × {0, 1}n. The system
parameters are param = {p,G,GT , e, n, g,Gpub,H1,H2}
and the master key of the system is msk = s.
• Extract: This algorithm is given an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗
and computes the corresponding private key dID = Q
s
ID,
where QID = H1(ID) ∈ G
∗.
• Encrypt: Given a message M ∈M and the identity ID as
the public key, this algorithm encrypts the message as C =
{gr,M ⊕H2(g
r
ID)} = {U, V }, where gID = e(QID, Gpub) ∈
G∗T and QID = H1(ID) ∈ G
∗.
• Decrypt: Given a ciphertext C encrypted by ID and the
private key dID, the algorithm decrypts the message byM =
V ⊕ H2(e(dID, U)) = M .
Security of IBE. The notion of ciphertext indistinguishability
for the security of public-key encryption has been introduced
to make an attacker obtain no information of the plaintext
from a given ciphertext [30]. A stronger security notion of
IND-CCA is proposed to satisfy the security requirement of
secure communication [31], where the attacker can decrypt
any chosen ciphertexts other than the target ciphertext.
An IBE is IND-CCA secure if the advantage of any proba-
bilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary, A, in the following
5game is negligible: 1) A issues m queries for the private keys
dIDi1 , ..., dIDim of IDi1 , ..., IDim ; 2) A may make polynomial
number of queries to a decryption oracle to obtain the cor-
responding plaintexts of the chosen ciphertext Ci with IDi;
3) A outputs two chosen messages (M1, M2) and the target
identity, which is not queried for the private key, and is given
a challenge ciphertext C∗ = Encrypt(param, ID∗,Mb) on
messageMb according to a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}; 4) A makes
another polynomial number of queries to extract the private
keys and decrypt for the plaintexts by the given identities and
ciphertexts (Restriction: The queried identites and ciphertexts
should be different from ID∗ and C∗); and 5) eventually, A
outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b′, A wins the game.
3) Proof on Dual Encryptions: To support traceability of
the group anonymous AKE in network-absent D2D com-
munications, we will adopt the concept of proof on dual
encryptions. The transcripts of each authentication session
is anonymous to the outsiders, including ProSe function, as
group anonymity is guaranteed. We leave a trapdoor for
the ProSe function to open the messages of the session by
encrypting the message in a session with the public key of
each participant device and the public key of ProSe function
and proving the encryptions on the same messages. Before
introducing the proof on dual encryptions, we introduce two
encryption algorithms, i.e., key-private and Linear public-key
encryptions. The procedures of key-private encryption are as
follows: 1) the public key and the private key of a user are
given by pk = (g, p,X) and sk = (g, p, x), respectively, and
2) the ciphertext of the key-private encryption on a message
M becomes C1 = (g
y,M · Xy) = (Y,C). One can decrypt
the message by M = C/Y x. The Linear encryption [25]
is underlaid on the decision linear problem and shown as
follows: 1) the public key and the private key of T are given
by pk = (u, v, h) and sk = (xˆ, yˆ), respectively, and 2) the
ciphertext of the linear encryption on a message M becomes
C2 = (M · h
β1+β2 , uβ1 , vβ2) = (Cˆ, T1, T2). One can decrypt
the message by M = Cˆ/
(
T xˆ1 · T
yˆ
2
)
. The proof of dual
encryptions, i.e., the key-private encryption and the linear
encryption, and its verification can be done as the following
two algorithms.
• EncProof(C1, C2, β1, β2, y) : First, the prover randomly
selects rβ1 , rβ2 , and ry , and computesR1= u
rβ1 , R2=v
rβ2 ,
and R3 = e(h, g)
rβ1+rβ2 · e(X, g)−ry . Then it computes
c=H(C1, C2, R1, R2, R3, T1, T2, X) and sβ1 = rβ1+cβ1,
sβ2 = rβ2 + cβ2, and sy = ry + cy. After that, the
prover outputs (c, sβ1 , sβ2 , sy, R1, R2, R3) as the proof to
the verifier.
• EncVer(C1, C2, c, sβ1 , sβ2 , sy, R1, R2, R3) : The verifier
then checks if C1 and C2 are the ciphertexts on the
same plaintext by R1 = u
sβ1 · T−c1 , R2 = v
sβ2 · T−c2 ,
R3 = e(h, g)
sβ1+sβ2 · e(X, g)−sy · e(C/Cˆ, g)c, and c =
H(C1, C2, R1, R2, R3, T1, T2, X). If the equations hold, the
ciphertexts produced by the prover are the encryptions on
the same plaintext, and this algorithm outputs true or false
otherwise.
B. Key Management and User Registration
The key management of the proposed GRAAD inherits the
key management of the conventional security architecture of
LTE, where each UEi shares a long-term secret key Ki with
HSS/AuC after registration. In addition, the key management
on UEs, ProSe function, and HSS/AuC for the security of
ProSe is considered as shown in Fig. 2. On HSS/AuC, the
real identity IDi, the corresponding application identity AIDi
and the shared secret Ki of each UE are stored. Additionally,
the HSS/AuC generates a master secret key, msk = s, for
randomly selected s ∈ Zp and the corresponding public
parameters, param, by Setup (as introduced in Sec. III-A2) to
build an BF-IBE system. On the ProSe function, AIDi and the
corresponding group identity GIDi of each UE are managed.
Besides that, the ProSe function is associated a unique secret
key Kp and generates a public/private key pair of Linear
encryption as {pkP = (u, v, h), skP = (xˆ, yˆ)}. HSS/AuC
issues each UEi a BF-IBE user private key dIDi = s · QUIDi
by Extract in Sec. III-A2, where QUIDi = H1(UIDi) and
UIDi = GIDi||AIDi.
C. Group Anonymous AKE for Network-covered D2D Com-
munication (CN-GD2C)
The notations are introduced in Table I and the key man-
agement is introduced in Sec. III-B for the proposed protocol.
The details of the proposed CN-GD2C protocol are as follows.
1) After negotiating the parameters for D2D communication,
UEi randomly selects a session identity sid ∈ Zp and
(xi, r) ∈ Z
2
p. It then computes X = g
xi , δi = H(AKi ⊕
sid) and Ei = {g
r, IDi⊕H2(g
r
TIDi
)} and send them to UEj ,
where TIDi = δi||X ||sid and Ei is the BF-IBE ciphertext.
2) UE2 keeps X and computes Y = g
yj , δj = H(AKj⊕sid),
and Ej = {g
r′ , IDj ⊕ H2(g
r′
TIDj
)} with randomly selected
yj , r
′, where TIDj = δj ||Y||sid and Ej is the BF-IBE ci-
phertext. It then sends sid, δi, δj, Ei, Ej ,X ,Y to HSS/AuC
via eNB.
3) The HSS/AuC first decrypts Ei and Ej by IDi = Ei,2 ⊕
H2(e(dTIDi , Ei,1)) and IDj = Ej,2 ⊕ H2(e(dTIDj , Ej,1)),
where TIDi = δi||X ||sid and TIDj = δj ||Y||sid. dTIDi
and dTIDj can be produced by the HSS/AuC with msk.
The HSS/AuC then finds the corresponding application
identities AIDi and AIDj of IDi and IDj and sends
sid, δi, δj,AIDi,AIDj to the ProSe function to check the
group information. If G(AIDi) = G(AIDj), then the ProSe
function computes acki = H(AKi ⊕ sid ⊕ true) and
ackj = H(AKj⊕sid⊕true), whereG(AID) returns the be-
longing group of AID and AKi = AIDi⊕GIDi⊕KP. Once
received sid, acki, ackj , and true, the HSS/AuC confirms
AIDi and AIDi belong to the same group and sends E
′
i =
ES(Ki, acki||(sid⊕R)) and E
′
j = ES(Kj , ackj||(sid⊕R))
to UEj .
4) UEj first decrypts E
′
i with Ki to obtain acki||(sid ⊕ R)
and verify acki
?
= H(AKi⊕sid⊕true). If so, UEj extracts
R from sid⊕R and sends E ′i to UEi.
5) UEi decrypts E
′
j withKj to obtain acki||(sid⊕R) and ver-
ify ackj the same as the previous step. Then, UEi extracts
R and sends RESi = ES(Ki, R) to UEj . Once received
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D2D Initialization
sid,X = gxi , δi = H(AKi ⊕ sid)
Ei = {Ei,1, Ei,2} = {g
r, IDi ⊕ H2(g
r
TIDi
)},
where TIDi = δi||X ||sid
Y = gyj ,δj = H(AKj ⊕ sid)
Ej = {g
r′ , IDj ⊕ H2(g
r′
TIDj
)}, where TIDj = δj ||Y||sid
Decrypt Ei, Ej by
IDi = Ei,2 ⊕ H2(e(dTIDi , Ei,1)) and
IDj = Ej,2 ⊕ H2(e(dTIDj , Ej,1))
sid,δi, δj , AIDi, AIDj
If G(AIDi) = G(AIDj) then
acki = H(AKi ⊕ sid⊕ true) and
ackj = H(AKj ⊕ sid⊕ true)
sid, δi, Ei, X
sid, δi, δj , Ei, Ej ,X ,Y
sid,acki,ackj ,true
E ′i = ES(Ki, acki||(sid⊕R)),
E ′j = ES(Kj , ackj ||(sid⊕R))E ′i , E
′
j
Decrypt E ′i , and verify acki and sid⊕R
E ′j
Decrypt E ′j , and verify ackj and sid⊕R
If correct, compute RESi = ES(Ki,R)
RESi
RESj = ES(Kj ,RESi ⊕R)
RESj
Decrypt RESj and RESi by
Kj and Ki to verify UEj and UEi
XRESi = H(Ki, sid),
XRESj = H(Kj , sid)
X yj = gxi·yj = KijY
xi = gyj ·xi = Kij
UE
ProSe
Function
{KP,(pkP, skP)}
HSS/AuC
(param,msk)
IDi, AIDi, param,
Ki, AKi,dIDi
(i = 0, 1, ...)
AIDi,GIDi
(i = 0, 1, ...)
AIDi, IDi,Ki
(i = 0, 1, ...)
The Key Management of GRAAD
Core NetworkE-UTRAN
XRESi = H(Ki, sid)
Fig. 2: Network-covered group anonymous D2D authenti-
cation protocol with the assistance of CN, including ProSe
function and HSS/AuC. Here, si, xi, yj , and R are randomly
selected number by UEi, UEj , and HSS/AuC, respectively.
RESi, UEj computes RESj = ES(Kj , RESi ⊕ R) and
sends to the HSS/AuC.
6) The HSS/AuC decrypts RESj with Kj to obtain RESi⊕
R. It then obtainsRESi from RESi⊕R by R and decrypts
RESi with Ki to check if it is equal to R. If so, HSS/AuC
sends XRESi = H(Ki, sid) and XRESj = H(Kj, sid)
to UEj , and UEj forwards XRESi to UEi. UEi and
UEj accept the authenticated key exchange session for the
following D2D communication between them according
the verification on XRESi and XRESj . Finally, UEi and
UEj computes the same session key by Kij = Y
xi =
gyj·xi = X yj = gxi·yj , respectively.
D. Group-anonymous AKE for Network-absent D2D Commu-
nication (NA-GD2C)
This section presents a group anonymous AKE for network-
absent D2D communication (NA-GD2C) protocol with trace-
ability, where only two devices are involved in the protocol.
Specifically, the objective of NA-GD2C protocol is to conceal
the group information of both devices from outsiders and
CN, except for a trusted authority that is granted to reveal
the group information of users and not a part of CN. As the
dispute is arisen in a session, designated authorities, i.e., ProSe
function and HSS/AuC, can engage to trace the identities
of the originators. Nonetheless, the identity of every UE is
revocable by announcing the revoked identities in the system.
The NA-GD2C protocol achieves the aforesaid goals based on
the techniques of k-anonymous secret handshakes, identity-
based encryption, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.
In the following subsections, we describe the design intu-
ition of group anonymous protection based on k-anonymous
secret handshakes and identity-based encryption. Then, we
present the propose the NA-GD2C protocol based on the
proposed group anonymous protection technique.
1) Group anonymity by k-anonymous Secret Handshakes:
The k-anonymous secret handshakes (SH) can achieve ad-
justable group anonymous authentication where the adversary
exists with the probability of 1
k
to identify the group informa-
tion of given user pairs [32]. Moreover, the k-anonymous SH
enjoys the property of revocability since it utilizes user certifi-
cates, which are reusable and can be revoked by announcing
certificate revocation list (CRL). Compared to the unlinkable
secret handshakes [33] by group signatures and group key
agreement, k-anonymous SH needs less computation costs. SH
supports each user to authenticate to the others according to the
possessed group information but not identity information [23],
[32], [34]. Namely, each user belonging to a group can
only successfully authenticate to the other users in the same
group. Otherwise, the authentication process does not leak
any information to the counterpart or eavesdroppers who do
not belong to the same group. However,the communication
costs of k-anonymous SH is linear to the anonymity degree,
i.e., k, for exchanging the public keys of selected user pairs
in the protocol. Hence, this work shows an enhanced k-
anonymous SH by applying identity-based encryption in the
design. The public keys of the selected user pairs are replaced
with the identities, which can be derived by constant number
of variables, of them. We propose the following four functions
to achieve k-anonymous SH with constant communication cost
in the proposed NA-GD2C.
• gSelect(G, U, w,Nu, Nv) : G is divided into {G1,...,Gw},
where Gz = {Gz0, ...,Gz⌈m/(w−1)⌉}, where U ∈ Giu for
some 0 ≤ i ≤ w − 1 and 0 ≤ u ≤ m/(w − 1). Set η =
f1(Nu, Nv, 0), x = f1(Nu, Nv, 1, ), and y = u+ r · (m/w),
where r is randomly selected from {0, ..., ⌊(p+1)·(w/m)⌋},
where p is a large prime. Solve θ1 with (y, η, x) such that
y = η · x + θ1 mod p. For z = 0 to w − 1 (except z =
i), set y = η · f1(Nu, Nv, 1, z) + θ1 mod p and sz = y
mod m/w. Then, compute σg = H(s0, ..., sw−1) and output
(θ1, σg).
• uSelect(G¯, X,w,Nu, Nv) : G¯ is divided into {G¯zsz }
w−1
z=0 ,
where G¯zsz ∈ G and X is the λ-th member of G¯asa
for some 0 ≤ a ≤ w − 1 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ |G¯asa | − 1.
Set η = f1(Nu, Nv, 2) and x = f1(Nu, Nv, 3, a, sa), and
y = λ + r · |G¯asa |, where r is selected randomly from
{0, ..., ⌊(p+ 1)/| ¯Gasa |⌋}. Solve θ2 with (y, η, x) such that
y = η · x+ θ2 mod p. For z = 0 to w − 1 (except z = a),
set y = η · f1(Nu, Nv, 3, z, sz) + θ2 mod p and λz = y
mod |G¯zsz |. It then computes σu = H(λ0, ..., λw−1) and
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D2D Initialization and distribute Nu, Nv
θ1, θ2, σg, σu
(θ1,σg) ← gSelect(G,U ,w,Nu,Nv)
(θ2,σu) ← uSelect(G¯,U ,w,Nu,Nv)
(s0, ..., sw−1) ← gSelectVer(G,w,Nu,Nv,σg)
{Uzsz ,λz}
w−1
z=0 ← uSelectVer(G¯,w,Nu,Nv, θ2,σu)
(θ′2,σ
′
u) ← uSelect(G¯,V ,w,Nu,Nv)
EV = {g
r, (δ||pkV )⊕ H2(g
r
I˜DUjsj
,λj
)}, where pkV = (g, p,XV )
{Vzsz ,λ′z}
w−1
z=0 ← uSelectVer(G¯,w,Nu,Nv, θ
′
2,σ
′
u)
EU = {g
r′ , (γ||pkU )⊕ H2(g
r′
I˜DVisi
,λ′
i
)} ,
where pkU = (g, p,XU )
Decrypt EV by δ
′||pkV = EV ,2 ⊕ H2(e(dI˜DUisi ,λi
, EV ,1))
σ0 = f0(γ, δ
′)
C1,U = (YU ,CU ) = (g
y, (γ||iU ) ·X
y
V )
C2,U = (T1,U ,T2,U , CˆU ) = (u
β1 , vβ2 , (γ||iU ) · h
β1+β2)
piU = (c, sβ1 , sβ2 , sy,R1,R2,R3) ← EncProof(C1,U ,C2,U ,β1,β2, y)
θ′2,σ
′
u
, EV
EU ,σ0,C1,U ,C2,U , c, sβ1 , sβ2 , sy,R1,R2,R3
Decrypt EV by γ
′||pkU = EU ,2 ⊕ H2(e(dI˜DVjsj ,λ
′
j
, EU ,1))
check if σ0 = f0(γ
′, δ),
true = EncVer(C1,U ,C2,U , c, sβ1 , sβ2 , sy,R1,R2,R3), and
decrypt C1,U to check γ
?
= γ′
if so, accepted and calculate σ1 = f0(γ
′, δ, 1)
C1,V = (YV ,CV ) = (g
y′ , (δ||iV ) ·X
y′
U )
C2,V = (T1,V ,T2,V , CˆV ) = (u
α′ , vβ
′
, (δ||iV ) · h
α′+β′)
piV = (c, s
′
β1
, s′β2 , s
′
y,R
′
1,R
′
2,R
′
3) ← EncProof(C1,V ,C2,V ,β
′
1,β
′
2, y
′)
σ1,C1,V ,C2,V , c
′, s′β1 , s
′
β2
, s′y,R
′
1,R
′
2,R
′
3
check if σ1 = f0(γ, δ
′, 1),
true = EncVer(C1,V ,C2,V , c
′, s′β1 , s
′
β2
, s′y,R
′
1,R
′
2,R
′
3), and
decrypt C1,V to check δ
∗
?
= δ′
if so, accepted and send σ2 = f0(γ, δ
′, 2)
σ2
Session Tracing
UEU or UEV sends ( ˜IDUisi ,λj
, ˜IDVjsj ,λi
),
the proofs (piU ,piV ), (C1,U ,C2,U ,C1,V ,C2,V ),
and (σ1,σ2)
check if σ2
?
= f0(γ
′, δ, 2) and accepted
Fig. 3: Network-absent group anonymous D2D authentica-
tion (NA-GD2C) protocol.
outputs (θ2, σu).
• gSelectVer(G, w,Nu, Nv, θ1, σg) : First, for z = 0 to w−1,
calculate η = f1(Nu, Nv, 0), y = η · f1(Nu, Nv, 1, z) + θ1
mod p, and sz = y mod m/w. After that, check whether
σg
?
= H(s0, ..., sw−1). If so, output (s0, ..., sw−1).
• uSelectVer(G¯, w,Nu, Nv, θ2, σu) : Parse G¯ as {G¯zsz }
w−1
z=0 .
Afterwards, for z = 0 to w−1, calculate η = f1(Nu, Nv, 2),
x = f1(Nu, Nv, 3, z, sz), y = η ·x+θ2 mod p, and λz = y
mod |G¯zsz |. Then, check whether σu
?
= H(λ0, ..., λw−1). If
so, output {Xzsz ,λz}
w−1
z=0 , where Xssz ,lambdaz denotes the
λz-th user in G¯zsz .
These four functions are to guarantee the exchanged group and
user information being selected randomly for k-anonymous
protection in NA-GD2C.
2) Proposed NA-GD2C Protocol: Let us consider n UEs,
U = {UE1, ...,UEn}, that belong to m different application
groups, G = {G1, ..., Gm}, in D2D communication. For UEi
with an assigned identity IDi, the identity-based user private
key dIDi is issued by HSS/AuC as introduced in Sec. III-B. Ad-
ditionally, IDi generates a public/private key pair, (pki, ski), of
key-private public key encryption as introduced in Sec. III-A3.
Each UE belongs to one group only, and G(Ui) = Gj means
the belonging group of Ui is Gj .
We consider two UEs, an UEU ∈ U belongs to the group
G(UEU ) = Gisi and an UEV ∈ U belongs to the group
G(UEV ) = Gjsj . For D2D communication between UEU and
UEV , they want to authenticate each other to check whether
they are legal users and belong to the same group. The protocol
of proposed group-anonymous D2D communication is shown
in Fig. 3 and described as follows.
1) In the beginning, UEU and UEV negotiate the param-
eters of D2D communication and exchange two ran-
dom numbers NU and NV selected by them, respec-
tively. Afterwards, UEU generates θ1, θ2, σg , and σu by
(θ1, σg)← gSelect(G,UEU , w,NU , NV ) and (θ2, σu)←
uSelect(G¯,UEU , w,NU , NV ) and sends them to UEV ,
where gSelect and uSelect are introduced in Sec. III-D1.
2) UEV generates (s0, ..., sw−1) ← gSelectVer(G¯, w, Nu,
Nv, σg), {Uzsz ,λz}
w−1
z=0 ← uSelectVer(G¯, V, w, Nu, Nv,
θ′2, σ
′
u), and encrypts a randomly selected δ ∈ Zp and pkV
as EV = {g
r, (δ||pkV )⊕H2(g
r
˜IDUjsj ,λj
)}, where r ∈ Zp is
selected at random. It then sends (θ′2, σ
′
u, EV ) to UEU .
3) UEU generates {Vzsz ,λ′z}
w−1
z=0 ← uSelectVer(G¯, w, Nu,
Nv, θ
′
2, σ
′
u), and encrypts a randomly selected γ ∈ Zp
and pkU as EU = {g
r′, (γ||pkU )⊕H2(g
r′
I˜DV
isi
,λ′
i
)}. It then
decrypts EV by δ
′||pk′V = EV,2 ⊕ H2(e(d ˜IDUisi ,λi
, EV,1))
to obtain δ′ and pk′V . Afterwards, UEU computes σ0 =
f0(γ, δ
′) and encrypts γ with pkP and pkU , skU as
C1,U = (YU , CU ) = (g
y, (γ||iU ) · X
y
V ) and C2,U =
(T1,U , T2,U , CˆU ) = (u
β1 , vβ2 , (γ||iU ) · h
β1+β2), where
iU is the group index of U such that U ∈ GiU . It
then obtains πU = (c, sβ1 , sβ2 , sy, R1, R2, R3) by run-
ning EncProof(C1,U , C2,U , β1, β2, y) as in Sec. III-A3 and
sends EU , σU , C1,U , C2,U , c, sβ1 , sβ2 , sy, R1, R2, and R3 to
UEV .
4) UEV first decrypts EV by γ
′||pkU = EU,2 ⊕
H2(e(dI˜DVjsj ,λj
, EU,1)) and checks if σU
?
= f0(γ
′, δ),
true
?
= EncVer(C1,U , C2,U , c, sβ1 , sβ2 , sy, R1, R2, R3),
and γ′||iU
?
= CU/Y
xV
U . If so, it accepts UEU
belonging to its group and computes σ1 = f0(γ
′, δ, 1),
C1,V = (YV , CV ) = (g
y′ , (δ||iV ) · X
y′
U ),
C2,V = (T1,V , T2,V , CˆV ) = (u
α′ , vβ
′
, (δ||iV ) · h
α′+β′),
and πV = (c, s
′
β1
, s′β2 , s
′
y, R
′
1, R
′
2, R
′
3) ←
EncProof(C1,V , C2,V , β
′
1, β
′
2, y
′), where iV is the group
index of V such that V ∈ GiV . After that, UEV sends
σ1, C1,V , C2,V , c
′, s′β1 , s
′
β2
, s′y, R
′
1, R
′
2, and R
′
3 to UEU .
5) UEU checks if σ1
?
= f0(γ, δ
′, 1), true
?
=
EncVer(C1,V , C2,V , c
′, s′β1 , s
′
β2
, s′y, R
′
1, R
′
2, R
′
3), and
δ′||iV
?
= CV /Y
xU
V . If so, it accepts UEV belonging to its
group and computes σ2 = f0(γ, δ
′, 2). UEU sends σ2 to
UEV . UEV then checks the correctness of σ2 and stores
it. Finally, UEU and UEV share the same session key
KU,V = f0(γ, δ, 3).
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In case of dispute or management requirement, UEU or
UEV sends ( ˜IDUisi ,λi
, ˜IDVjsj ,λj
), (πU , πV ), and σ1, σ2 to
the ProSe function to prove the participation of UEU and
UEV in the specified D2D communication session as fol-
lows. The ProSe function first checks the correctness of
(C1,U , C2,U , C1,V , C2,V ) by EncVer with (πU , πV ) as in
Sec. III-A3. It then decrypts C2,U and C2,V to obtain γ and
δ by CˆU/(T
xˆ
1,U ·T
yˆ
2,U ) and CˆV /(T
xˆ
1,V · T
yˆ
2,V ) to verify σ0, σ1
or σ2.
F. Membership Management
The membership of the proposed two protocols can be
managed as follows. For CN-GD2C, once any member of an
application group joins or leaves, the HSS/AuC and ProSe
function will update the membership information. Since every
authentication needs to interact with HSS/AuC and ProSe
function, each membership update will immediately take effect
in the following D2D authentication sessions. For NA-GD2C,
every authentication uses the identities of UEs in different
application groups. Hence, HSS/AuC will issue the corre-
sponding user private key for each new UE, and revoke the
identities of revoked UEs and list them on the revocation list
in public. In summary, the costs of membership maintenance
are both constants for CN-GD2C and NA-GD2C regardless of
the number of groups and UEs in the system.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove the security of the proposed
protocols based on the security definition in Sec. II-B.
A. Security Analysis of CN-GD2C Protocol
In the network-covered D2D communications, traceability
and revocability are readily guaranteed as all communications
of UEs are performed under the control of CN. Hence, we
prove that the proposed CN-GD2C protocol achieves the
mutual authentication, secure key exchange for end-to-end
security, and identity and group anonymity as follows.
Theorem 1: (Mutual Authentication) The proposed CN-
GD2C protocol is a mutual authentication protocol between
two UEs if ES is a pesudorandom permutation and H is a
pseudorandom function.
Proof: The CN-GD2C achieves mutual authentication
between UEi and UEj by the verification of (RESi, RESj)
by HSS/AuC and that of (E ′i , E
′
j) and (XRESi, XRESj) by
UEi and UEj , respectively. We define Adv
auth
A = Pr[E1 ∨
E2 ∨ E3 ∨ E4 ∨ E5 ∨ E6], where E1 and E2 are the events
that A successfully impersonates the HSS/AuC by sending
a verifiable E ′i and E
′
j , E3 is the event that A successfully
impersonates UEi by sending a correct RESi, E4 is the
event that A impersonates UEj by sending a correct RESj ,
E5 and E6 are the events that A impersonates HSS/AuC
by sending XRESi or XRESj , accepted by UEi or UEj ,
respectively. Here, Pr[E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3 ∨ E4 ∨ E5 ∨ E6] ≤
Pr[E1]+Pr[E2]+Pr[E3]+Pr[E4]+Pr[E5]+Pr[E6]. Hence,
we prove that the probabilities are negligible to guarantee that
Adv
auth
A is negligible for mutual authentication security as
follows.
For the case of Pr[E1], we consider ES as a pseudorandom
permutation and the advantage ǫ of distinguishing a pseudo-
random permutation and random permutation is negligible. A
simulator S is given a function ESb by the challenger according
to a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, where ES0 is a pseudorandom
permutation and ES1 is a random permutation. S simulates
the protocol and interacts with A by the given ESb. We say
that A, acting as a HSS/AuC, can send out a correct E ′i to
be accepted by S with the probability ǫ′. Since the probability
that A sends a correct E ′i with a random permutation, i.e., ES1,
is negligible, S outputs a guess b′ = 1 when E ′i sent by A is
accepted. Otherwise, A outputs b′ = 0 or b′ = 1 randomly.
From the above, we have that Pr[b = b′] = Pr[b = b′, b = 0]+
Pr[b = b′, b = 1] = Pr[b = b′|b = 0]Pr[b = 0] +
Pr[b = b′|b = 1]Pr[b = 1] = (12 + ǫ
′)12 +
1
2 ×
1
2 =
(1+ǫ′)
2 . If b = b
′, ESb is distinguished. Obviously, ǫ ≥ Pr[b =
b′]− 12 =
ǫ′
2 . Hence, ǫ
′ is negligible since ǫ is also negligible
based on pseudorandom permutation. We can prove Pr[E2],
Pr[E3], Pr[E4], Pr[E5], and Pr[E6] are also negligible by
the similar way. Based on the above proof, we conclude that
Adv
auth
A = Pr[E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3 ∨ E4 ∨ E5 ∨ E6] is negligible
and mutual authentication between UE1 and UE2 holds.
Theorem 2: (Secure Key Exchange) The proposed CN-
GD2C protocol is an authenticated key exchange protocol
between two UEs if Diffie-Hellman assumption holds.
Proof: This proof is separated as two parts, session
key security and known key security. Regarding the session
key security of Kij , it is based on the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) assumption, where a truly DDH tuple (X =
gx,Y = gy,Kij = g
xy) is indistinguishable from a random
tuple (gx, gy, gz). That is, the security of DDH assumption
is reducible to the security of Kij as follows. One can
construct a simulator S to simulate CN-GD2C by a given
tuple (gx, gy, gz), which is either a DDH or random tuple.
If an adversary A, interacting with S, can distinguished the
generated session key from a random string in the simulated
protocol with an advantage of ǫ. S is able to distinguish the
given DDH tuple with an advantage of ǫ′. The probability of
distinguishing the session key or a random string is 1/2 + ǫ.
The probability of distinguishing the DDH tuple from a
random tuple by the guessing result from A is (1 + ǫ)/2.
Obviously, ǫ′ is greater than or equal to (1 + ǫ)/2 and ǫ′ is
negligible [24]. Hence, ǫ is also negligible.
In terms of known key security, we have to ensure that the
DDH tuple (X = gx,Y = gy) actually contributes to produce
a unique session key gxy without any material injected [35].
Assume that there is no collusion with the CN and any
adversary. X and Y are authenticated as shown in Theorem 1.
Therefore, no adversary is able to change X and Y based on
the security of mutual authentication.
In the network-covered D2D communication, the anonymity
between UE and CN is infeasible as all UEs are under the
coverage of CN. However, in this case, it is important to
guarantee the group anonymity between UEs, especially when
they are in different groups. In the following theorem, we
9prove the partial group anonymity, i.e., that between UEs, of
the CN-GD2C protocol.
Theorem 3: (Identity and Group Anonymity) The pro-
posed CN-GD2C protocol is a identity and group anonymous
protocol between UEi and UEj if mutual authentication is
guaranteed and BF-IBE is IND-CCA secure.
Proof: Before proving group anonymity, we should
prove identity anonymity of the CN-GD2C as the sufficient
and necessary condition. The CN-GD2C guarantees identity
anonymity based on the IND-CCA security of BF-IBF. Thus,
we have to prove the identity anonymity of the CN-GD2C
is reducible to the key-private security of BF-IBF. One can
create S, who is an attacker of the IND-CCA security of
BF-IBE, simulates the CN-GD2C interacting with an identity
anonymous attacker A. A challenger CBF−IBE of BF-IBE
provides encryption and decryption oracles for the security
game as defined in Definition 3. S can simulate CN-GD2C
by generating all required secret keys, except the BF-IBE user
private keys of Πt1i,j and Π
t2
j,i.
We now prove the identity anonymity of UEi and UEj
by simulating CN-GD2C with CBF−IBE and A, respectively.
First, we prove the identity anonymity of UEi as follows.
S selects two messages IDi,0 = IDi and a random string
IDi,1 = ℜ and send to CBF−IBE . CBF−IBE then encrypts
IDi,b as Ei according to b ∈ {0, 1}. S then simulates an AKE
session of CN-GD2C with Ei. After the simulation, A queries
TestID(Πsi,j) to S and S returns ID
′
i,b according to a random
bit c ∈ {0, 1}, where ID′i,0 = IDi and ID
′
i,1 = ℜ
′, which is a
random string. A outputs c′ as the guess of c. If c′ = c, then S
outputs b = 0 or b = 1 otherwise. The probability of breaking
the IND-CCA security of BF-IBE is Pr[b = b′] and can be
rewritten as Pr[b = b′] = Pr[b = b′|b = 0]Pr[b = 0] +Pr[b =
b′|b = 1]Pr[b = 1]. Under a real experiment (b = 0), A can
win the game by successfully guessing (c = c′) with probabil-
ity 12 +ǫ
′, where Advanon idA = ǫ
′. A can only randomly guess
(c = c′) with probability 1/2 under a random experiment, i.e.,
Pr[b = b′|b = 0] = 12 + ǫ
′ and Pr[b = b′|b = 1] = 1/2. Hence,
Pr[b = b′] = (12 + ǫ
′)12 +
1
2 ×
1
2 = (1 + ǫ
′)/2. Obviously,
the probability of breaking IND-CCA security of BF-IBE is
ǫ ≥ Pr[b = b′] = 1+ǫ
′
2 −
1
2 =
ǫ′
2 . Adv
anon id
A = ǫ
′ is negligible
due to ǫ is negligible. The identity anonymity of UEj can also
be proven in the similar way as the above. Hence, the CN-
GD2C is an identity anonymous AKE protocol for UEi and
UEj .
The group anonymity is guaranteed since the group infor-
mation of UEs is only known by the ProSe function. Besides
that, the ProSe function will only check the group information
for the valid UEs, who can send out acki and ackj , in each
AKE session. The security of acki and ackj depends on the
authorization keys, AKi and AKj , issued for UEj and UEj ,
and the correctness of AIDi and AIDj depends on the trust
of HSS/AuC to ProSe function. We can prove that acki and
ackj can only be sent out by the legal UEi and UEj based on
the pseudorandom function assumption in the similar concept
of the proof of Theorem 1. Hence, the identity anonymity is
guaranteed to outsider attackers and the group anonymity to
outsider attackers and the HSS/AuC.
B. Security Analysis of NA-GD2C Protocol
In this section, we prove that the proposed NA-GD2C pro-
tocol achieves the mutual authentication, secure key exchange
(for end-to-end security), group anonymity, and traceability
and revocability.
Theorem 4: (Mutual Authentication) The proposed GD2C
protocol is a mutual authentication protocol between two UEs
if BF-IBE is IND-CCA secure.
Proof: In NA-GD2C, UEU and UEV verify σ0 and σ1
for mutual authentication. The functions, gSelect, gSelectVer,
uSelect, and uSelectVer guarantee that the obtained user
indices of UEU and UEV will include the identity of each
other. Hence, if UEU and UEV are in the same group,
they will select the identity of each other to encrypt δ and
γ randomly selected by UEV and UEU , respectively. S,
who is an attacker of IND-CCA secure BF-IBE, simulates
CN-GD2C interacting with the attacker A against mutual
authentication. First, S simulates ΠsU,V as UEU interacting
with A impersonating UEV by the BF-IBE ciphertext EU
on one of two submitted γ and γ∗ to the challenger C of
IND-CCA secure BF-IBE. EU is produced according to a
random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 0, EU is the ciphertext of
γ or γ∗ otherwise. In the real experiment (i.e., b = 0), A
can successfully send out a correct σ1 = f0(γ, δ
′) with the
probability of ǫ′. In the random experiment (i.e, b = 1), A is
with probability of 2−k to produce σ1 since γ is never exposed
toA. The probability of break IND-CCA security of BF-IBE is
ǫ ≥ Pr[b = b′] = Pr[b = b′|b = 0]Pr[b = 0] + Pr[b = b′|b =
1]Pr[b = 1] = (12 + ǫ
′)12 + (
1
2 +
1
2k )
1
2 . Since ǫ is negligible
based on IND-CCA security, ǫ′ = AdvauthA is also negligible.
We can also prove the impersonation of UEV by A in the
same notion as the above. Conclusively, A has only negligible
probability to break mutual authentication in NA-GD2C based
on IND-CCA secure BF-IBE.
Theorem 5: (Secure Key Exchange) The proposed NA-
GD2C protocol is a secure key exchange protocol between
UEU and UEV if BF-IBE is IND-CCA secure.
Proof: In the NA-GD2C protocol, the exchanged session
key is KU,V = f0(γ, δ, 3), where γ and δ are authentic,
and f0 is a secure hash function and can be regarded as a
pseudorandom function. Hence, in the case of unknown γ
and δ, the session key is indistinguishable from truly random
string of equal length. The security of pseudorandom function
is reducible to the security of NA-GD2C protocol. Namely,
one can build an algorithm to exploit the ability of A in the
proposed NA-GD2C protocol to distinguish Hˆ from a truly
random function. If A can successfully distinguish the session
key from a random string, one can also successfully distinguish
f0 from a truly random function. It means that the advantage
of distinguishing f0 from a truly random function is greater
than or equal to the advantage of distinguishing the session
key from a random string in the proposed NA-GD2C protocol.
Here, the advantage of distinguishing f0 from a truly random
function is negligible, and consequently, that of distinguishing
the session key from a random string is also negligible.
Theorem 6: (Identity and Group Anonymity) The proposed
NA-GD2C protocol is a k-anonymous authentication protocol
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TABLE II: Computation Costs of the Proposed Schemes
CN-GD2C NA-GD2C NA-GD2C (Traceability)
Costs TIBE + 2TH + 2TES + TDH TIBE + 3TH
TKPE+TKPD+TLIN +8TEXP +
3TP +6TH+(2w)Tmul+(2w+2)TH
Computation time (w = 10) 1.5716 ms 0.824 ms 5.978 ms
Computation time (w = 50) 1.5716 ms 0.824 ms 6.826 ms
Message Length 852-bit (UEi) + 1832-bit (UEj ) 1066-bit (UEU )+682-bit (UEV ) 3574-bit (UEU )+ 3190-bit (UEV )
TIBE : the computation time of BF-IBE encryption/decryption (with plaintext of 128-bit and group element of 170-bit)
TDH : the computation time of Diffie-Hellman (with the prime of 1024-bit and the exponential of 160-bit)
TES : the computation time of symmetric encryption (AES)(with an input of 128-bit)
TH: the computation time of one-way hash function (SHA-256)(with an input of 128-bit)
TKPE : the computation time of key-private encryption (with plaintext of 170-bit and public key of 3× 170-bits)
TKPD : the computation time of key-private decryption (with ciphertext of 2×170-bit)
TLIN : the computaion time of Linear encryption/decryption (with plaintext of 170-bit, public key of 3×170-bit, and ciphertext of 3×170-bit)
TEXP : the computation time of exponential operation in G
TP : the computation time of pairing
TDH=0.74 ms, TES = 6.8 × 10
−3ms, TH=0.006 ms, TEXP =0.37 ms, TIBE=0.806 ms, TKPE=TKPD=2TEXP = 0.74 ms,
TLIN=3TEXP =1.11 ms, TP =0.06 ms, Tmul=0.004 ms
if BF-IBE is IND-CCA secure.
Proof Sketch: The identity and group information of two
UEs are guaranteed based on the IND-CCA security of BF-
IBE as the same concept in Theorem 3. Hence, the NA-GD2C
achieves k identity and group anonymity by perfectly hiding
them in one of the k selected groups and identities.
Theorem 7: (Full Traceability) The proposed NA-GD2C
protocol is with full traceability1, i.e., no PPT adversary or
no colluding set of UEs can successfully authenticate any UE
with identities that do not exist or belong to other UEs, if
the linear encrypt and key private encryption are semantically
secure.
Proof: The security of full traceability of the NA-GD2C
protocol is based on the security of the zero-knowledge proof
on the same plaintext of the linear encryption and the key-
private encryption. The concept of proving two encryptions
on a message without revealing any knowledge of the mes-
sage is originally applied for building encryption schemes
of stronger security (e.g., IND-CPA→IND-CCA1 and IND-
CCA1→IND-CCA2 [37], [38]). Using a non-interactive zero-
knowledge (NIZK) to prove that two encryptions are for the
same message, one can simulate the decryption oracle by one
of the two encryptions. The security of traceability has to
consider two kinds of adversaries; 1) the one who may produce
a false proof on two encryptions of different messages and
2) the one who may produce a new proof different from the
original proof without the random secrets α, β, and x. The
security of traceability of the proposed GD2C consists of two
security properties as follows.
1) Zero knowledge: One can prove that the prover in pos-
session of the trapdoor to produce a false proof to prove
C and Cˆ are the encryptions of the same message even if
they are the encryptions of different messages as follows. The
prover computesR3 = e(h, g)
rα+rβ ·e(Y, g)−rx ·e(M2
M1
, g)c and
outputs c as the hash value while the input of the controlled
random oracle H is (C1, C2, R1, R2, R3, T1, T2, Y ), where
M1 and M2 are the messages of C1 and C2. Hence, c
is considered as a random number generated by a secure
1The notion of full traceability introduced in [36] is to model a coalition of
members breaking the security of traceability. That is, any of the members may
break traceability by authenticating the other member without being traced to
any identity of the coalition group.
hash function. The security of preventing any adversary from
generating a proof on two encryptions of different messages.
2) Simulation sound: A challenger C simulates the scheme of
traceability and interacts with an attacker A. It is infeasible
for A to produce a proof π to produce another proof π′ =
(c′, s′α, s
′
β , s
′
x). Otherwise, C is able to computes ∆c = c− c
′,
∆sα = sα − s
′
α, ∆sβ = sβ − s
′
β , and ∆sx = sx − s
′
x, and
computes α = ∆sα/∆c, β = ∆sβ/∆c, and x = ∆sx/∆c.
Then C can extract M by Cˆ/hα+β to break the Linear
encryption and by C/Y x to break the key-private encryption.
Assume that the probability of producing a false proof is ǫ,
the probability of breaking the Linear encryption is ǫLIN , and
the probability of breaking the key-private encryption is ǫKP .
From the above, we have that ǫ ≤ ǫLIN × ǫKP . ǫLIN and
ǫKP are negligible. To sum up, the probability of producing
a proof on the C1 and C2 by A is negligible.
V. COMPARISONS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare the security properties of this
work with two related works [19], [20], and analyze and
evaluate the computation cost and authentication success rate
for the proposed GD2C protocols.
A. Comparison on Security Properties
We compare the security properties of the proposed pro-
tocols with SeDS [19] and a light-weight D2D-assist data
transmission protocol (LSD) [20] as shown in Table III. For
mutual authentication, in SeDS, the message sent by eNB in
step 5 can be replayed without being checked out. For end-
to-end security, LDS only claims to be achieved by DH key
agreement and does not concrete in the protocol. For network-
absent secure D2D communication, only the proposed NA-
GD2C provides. Besides that, only the proposed protocol can
achieve both identity and group anonymity.
B. Computation and Communication Costs
In this section, we evaluate the computation/communication
costs of the proposed schemes empirically on a smartphone
of HTC One X as a testbed. The smartphone runs Android
4.1.1 mobile operating system and is equipped with 1.5
GHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A9 CPU and 1GB RAM. The
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TABLE III: Comparisons on Security Properties
Properties SeDS [19] LSD [20] Ours
Mutual Authentication - X X
End-to-End Security X ? X
Pseudonymity X X X
Anonymity x X X
Forward Secrecy X ? X
Network-absent D2D x ? X
Group Anonymity x x X
cryptographic libraries for the implementation are java pair-
ing based cryptography (JPBC) [39] and Java Cryptography
Extension (JCE) [40]. Table II shows the total computation
cost (time) and the message length of the proposed two
schemes, and the definitions of related computation times.
Regarding the message length, we build the pairing mapping
by MNT curves [41] for 80 bits security, where the length of
an element from G1 is 170 bits and from GT is 340 bits. For
storage cost, it only takes 682-bit in total on every UEi, where
(128× 4) bits for (IDi,AIDi,Ki, AKi) and 170 bits for dIDi .
C. Authentication Success Rate of D2D Communications
In this section, we analyze the authentication success rate
(ASR) of the proposed protocols to evaluate their feasibility.
The measurement of ASR considers the effects of the arrival
rate of D2D authentication requests and the residence time
of a host device in eNB and that in the coverage of D2D
communications (i.e., the time that both devices are in the
D2D communication coverage of each other) affect the ASR.
For convenience, we name a device that initiates D2D commu-
nication as a host device and a device that is the counterpart
of the host device, as a target device.
In the authentication process, the host device will reserve
its resource for authentication (e.g., CPU) for each incoming
device in first-come-first-serve (FCFS) manner. The authen-
tication fails whenever the target device departs from the
coverage of D2D communication or one of the host and target
devices departs from the coverage of eNB in network-covered
case, before finishing authentication of the target device at the
host device.
We denote the residence time of a host device in the D2D
communication coverage of a target device as trd, and the
residence time of the host device in eNB2 as tr. The system
authentication time is denoted by ta, defined as ta = tQ +
ts, where tQ is the waiting time in queue for authentication
processing and ts is the authentication processing time. To
evaluate the ASR, we give the following assumptions.
1) Every device authenticates only one device at a time.
2) The host device residence time trd in the coverage of a tar-
get device (i.e., the residence time in D2D communication)
is exponentially distributed with mean 1/λrd.
3) The host device residence time tr in the coverage of an
eNB is exponentially distributed with mean 1/λr.
2In D2D communication, each of two devices connect to the same eNB for
authentication is not needed as long as the eNBs connect to the same CN such
that the authentication messages between devices and CN can be transmitted
through the eNBs that the devices attach.
4) The authentication processing time ts is constant as Tˆs.
5) The arrival rate of host devices entering the coverage of a
given target device follows Poisson random process with
mean λt.
Note that in [42], [43], the expected session key life time is
estimated by observing the probability that the life time of
session key is greater than or equal to the residence time in
new AP, where the residence time in AP is assumed to be
exponentially distributed. Hence, we reasonably assume that
the residence time in D2D communication and that in eNB are
exponentially distributed. We now analyze the ASRs of both
proposed protocols for network-covered and network-absent
cases. Note that fX(x) denotes the pdf of random variable X
in the following analysis.
1) ASR of NA-GD2C Protocol: The ASR in network-absent
D2D communication is mainly affected by trd and ta, and it
is derived as follows.
Lemma 1: The authentication success rate of the proposed
NA-GD2C protocol is
R =
e−2λrdTˆs(1− λtTˆs)λrd
λrd − λt(1− e−λrdTˆs)
. (5)
Proof: The authentication is successful when the resi-
dence time in D2D communication is greater than or equal
to the system authentication, which includes the waiting time
in queue and the authentication time. Hence, the ASR can be
presented as
R =Pr[ta ≤ trd] = Pr[ts ≤ trd − tQ]
=Pr[ta ≤ trd|trd ≥ Tˆs] Pr[trd ≥ Tˆs]
+ Pr[ta ≤ trd|trd < Tˆs] Pr[trd < Tˆs].
(6)
In (6), when trd ≤ Tˆs, the probability that ta ≤ trd is zero
since ta = tQ + Tˆs. Hence, the ASR is represented by
R = Pr[ta ≤ trd|trd ≥ Tˆs] Pr[trd ≥ Tˆs]. (7)
In (7), Pr[ta ≤ trd|trd ≥ Tˆs] can be derived as
Pr[ta ≤ trd|trd ≥ Tˆs] = Pr[trd ≥ tQ + Tˆs|trd ≥ Tˆs]
=
∫ ∞
0
{∫ ∞
x+Tˆs
ftrd(y) dy
}
ftQ(x) dx
=
∫ ∞
0
e−λrd(x+Tˆs)ftQ(x) dx = e
−λrdTˆs
∫ ∞
0
e−λrdxftQ(x) dx
= e−λrdTˆsLtQ(λrd)
(8)
where LtQ(s) is the Laplace transform of tQ. Since the
interarrival time of the target devices is exponential distributed
with mean 1/λt, from M/G/1 queueing analysis in [44],
LtQ(λrd) is given by
LtQ(λrd) =
(1− ρ)λrd
λrd − λt + λtLts(λrd)
(9)
where ρ = λtTˆs. Since the authentication processing time ts
is constant as Tˆs, its Laplace transform is given by
Lts(λrd) =
∫ ∞
t=0
e−λrdtfts(t) dt = e
−λrdTˆs . (10)
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From (8), (9), and (10), we have
Pr[ta ≤ trd|trd ≥ Tˆs] =
e−λrdTˆs(1− ρ)λrd
λrd − λt(1− e−λrdTˆs)
. (11)
The probability that the residence time of D2D communication
is equal to or greater than Tˆs is given by
Pr[trd ≥ Tˆs] =
∫ ∞
Tˆs
λrde
−λrdx dx = e−λrdTˆs . (12)
By (11) and (12), we finally obtain (5).
Figure 4 shows the authentication success rate with various
trd with time unit, Tˆs. In this figure, we can first see that our
analysis on ASR is similar to the simulation result, which
verifies the correctness of the analysis. We then also see
that the ASR is more than 0.8 when trd is 10 times of
ta, which means that lower authentication processing time
results in higher ASR regarding fixed residence time in D2D
communication.
From (5), we can explore the effects of λrd and λt on
the ASR. Let the mean residence time of device in D2D
communication be 1/λrd = crdTˆs and the mean interarrival
time of device be 1/λt = ctTˆs, where crd, ct ∈ [0,∞]. Thus,
the ASR is represented as
R =
e
−
2
crd
(
1
ct
− 1
)
1
ct
− 1
crd
(
1− e
− 1crd
) . (13)
We show the ASR as a function of crd for a given ct = 2.
We have that if the system wants to obtain an ASR of at least
80%, crd should be greater than or equal to 11.091, which
is also confirmed by (13). When the mean interarrival time
of device is 2 times of the authentication processing time,
the mean residence time of device in D2D communication
should be greater than or equal to 11.091 times of Tˆs. With
Tˆs = 6.826 ms (# of group is 50) as in table II a device can
achieve the ASR of more than 80% by serving 146.49 authen-
tication requests per second for 1/λt ≥ 2Tˆs where the mean
residence time of device in D2D communication is greater than
or equal to 75.707 ms. This proves that the proposed NA-
GD2C protocol is feasible to general D2D communications
considering the density of D2D communication users and their
mobility [45].
2) ASR of CN-GD2C Protocool: For the ASR in network-
covered D2D communication, it needs to additionally consider
the residence time that one of D2D devices is in the coverage
of eNB. In figure 2, UEi and UEj negotiate the parameters for
D2D communication and UEi sends a request and its identity
to start the authentication. Hence, both UEi and UEj need
to reside in the coverage of each other before authentication.
Thus, the ASR of CN-GD2C can be derived as follows.
Lemma 2: The authentication success rate of the proposed
CN-GD2C protocol is given by
R=
e−2Tˆs(λr+λrd)
(
1−λtTˆs
)2
λrdλr{
λrd−λt
(
1−e−λrdTˆs
)}{
λr−λt
(
1−e−λrTˆs
)} . (14)
Proof: A successful authentication in CN-GD2C protocol
requires that the residence times in D2D communication and
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Fig. 4: Authentication success rate of CN-GD2C protocol as
a function of the ratio of the mean residence time in eNB
to Tˆs (i.e., cr = E[tr]/Tˆs =
1
λtTˆs
) with fixed ct = 2 and
crd = 10. Authentication success rate of NA-GD2C protocol
as a function of the ratio of the mean residence time of D2D
communication to the authentication processing time (i.e.,
crd = E[trd]/Tˆs =
1
λrdTˆs
) with a fixed ct = 2.
eNB should be greater than or equal to the system authentica-
tion, including the waiting time in queue and the authentication
processing time, for each device. Hence, the ASR can be
represented as
R = Pr [ta ≤ trd, ta ≤ tr] = Pr [ta ≤ trd] Pr [ta ≤ tr] (15)
where Pr[ta ≥ tr] is given by
Pr[ta ≤ tr|tr ≥ Tˆs] = Pr[tQ + Tˆs ≤ tr|tr ≥ Ts]
= Pr[tQ ≤ tr − Tˆs|tr − Tˆs ≥ 0]
=
e−2λr Tˆs(1− ρ)λr
λr − λt(1− e−λr Tˆs)
.
(16)
which is obtained in similar way as (8), (9), and (10). From
(5), (15) and (16), we finally obtain
R =
e−2λrdTˆs(1− ρ)λrd
λrd − λt(1 − e−λrdTˆs)
×
e−2λr Tˆs(1− ρ)λr
λr − λt(1− e−λr Tˆs)
which is equal to (14).
Figure 4 shows the analytic and simulation results of the
ASR for network-covered D2D communications according to
tr with time unit, Tˆs. In this figure, we can also see that our
analysis on ASR is similar to the simulation result, which
verifies the correctness of the analysis.
By equation (14), let the mean residence time of device in
D2D communication be crdTˆs, the mean interarrival time of
device be ctTˆs, and the mean residence time of device in eNB
be crTˆs, such that one can estimate the ASR as
R=
e
−2
(
1
crd
+ 1cr
)(
1− 1
ct
)
1
crd
1
crd
− 1
ct
(
1− e
−
1
crd
) × (1−
1
ct
) 1
cr
1
cr
− 1
ct
(
1− e−
1
cr
) . (17)
By equation (17), there are various combinations of 1
λrd
and
1
λr
with fixed 1
λt
= 2Tˆs that make R
′ greater than or equal
to 80%. Considering that the range of the communication
between devices is stricter than that between eNB and devices,
we may select a combination to minimize 1
λrd
guarantee the
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ASR can be greater than or equal to 80%. To this end, a
combination that 1
λr
= 12.915Tˆs,
1
λrd
= 83.022Tˆs, and
1
λt
≥ 2Tˆs, guarantees the ASR is greater than or equal to
80%. For Tˆs = 1.5716 ms as in table II, a device can serve
at most 636.29 devices per second with 1/λt = 3.1432 ms.
Hence, the proposed CN-GD2C protocol completely satisfy
the requirements of D2D communications.
From the above results, we can see that both NA-GD2C and
CN-GD2C protocols are adequate for D2D communication
regarding performance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This work proposes two group AKE protocol for securing
network-covered and network-absent D2D communications
with traceability and guaranteeing end-to-end confidentiality
to network operators for D2D applications. Specifically, their
security can be proven based on the security of pseudoran-
dom function, pseudorandom permutation, IND-CCA IBE,
linear encryption, and key-private encryption. Furthermore,
the performance analyses show the effect of the computa-
tion costs depending on ASRs by using M/G/1 queueing
model, which reflects the effects of the residence times in
D2D communication and in eNB, the inter-arrival time of
devices, and the authentication processing time on the ASR.
The communication costs of both protocol are considerably
low even the new security properties are provided. Hence,
the feasibility and scalability of this work are demonstrated
to support efficient secure D2D communication in mobile
networks.
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